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The study of animal cognition is rife with controversy, and among the most long-standing and 26 
most intensely debated controversies in the field is the question to what extent the behaviour 27 
of non-human animals can be fully understood on the basis of purely associative principles, or 28 
whether some behaviours exhibited by animals necessitate the assumption of inferential 29 
capacities in animals that defy an associative explanation. Remarkably, the continuing debate 30 
on the topic seems to be spawning little genuine progress in terms of substantial accumulation 31 
of new, generally accepted, insights. As an introduction to a special section of the Journal of 32 
Comparative Psychology on the topic, the present paper outlines a number of reasons for the 33 
stalemate and suggests ways to re-fertilise the debate. In particular, we claim that progress 34 
will not come from the adoption of general principles like Morgan’s Canon or the primacy of 35 
prediction over postdiction. Instead, emphasis should be placed on a careful analysis of what 36 
it is that different sides in the debate do and do not agree on and an increased willingness to 37 
engage in adversarial collaboration, in the spirit of a shared interest in furthering our 38 
understanding of animal behaviour. 39 
Key-words: Animal cognition, Reasoning versus association, Morgan’s Canon, Psychological 40 
continuity, Adversarial collaboration 41 
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Reasoning Versus Association in Animal Cognition: Current Controversies and Possible 43 
Ways Forward 44 
The study of animal cognition is rife with controversy, and among the most long-45 
standing and most intensely debated controversies in the field is the question to what extent 46 
the behaviour of non-human animals can be fully understood on the basis of purely 47 
associative principles, or whether some behaviours exhibited by animals necessitate the 48 
assumption of inferential capacities in animals that defy an associative explanation (Heyes, 49 
2012; Penn & Povinelli, 2007).  One of the most remarkable features of this controversy 50 
regarding the nature of animal cognition is its tenacity. Indeed, the origins of the debate can 51 
be traced back to Romanes (1882), Morgan (1894), and beyond (see Greenwood, this issue, 52 
for a historical overview). Yet, despite its long standing, it does not seem like we are making 53 
much progress towards consensus. Papers are continually being published suggesting 54 
cognitive capacities in non-human animals that defy an associative explanation, which keep 55 
being met with scepticism by people in the associative camp (indeed, the very fact that 56 
“camp” is a natural term to use in describing the situation is evocative of the degree to which 57 
this appears at times to be an ideological debate). It is true that some degree of controversy 58 
and disagreement is beneficial, as it provides fuel for scientific inquiry. However, for the 59 
present debate the continuing controversy seems to be spawning little genuine progress in 60 
terms of substantial accumulation of new, generally accepted, insights. As a result, the 61 
enduring controversy often seems more sterile than fruitful.  Against this background, in late 62 
2013 a special meeting was arranged by Tom Beckers and Jan De Houwer in Ghent to bring 63 
together people of different views in an effort to re-fertilise the debate and move beyond the 64 
current stalemate.  The collection of papers assembled in the present special section represent 65 
(in part) the content and subsequent effects of that meeting. Here we outline a number of 66 
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critical issues in furthering the debate, discuss how the papers in the special section contribute 67 
to that aim, and point to other developments that are likely to improve on the status quo. 68 
 69 
Conceptual issues: History and the (in)adequacy of Morgan’s Canon 70 
The debate regarding the associative or more complex (that is, more cognitively rich; 71 
see Haselgrove, this issue) nature of animal cognition is strongly connected with the debate 72 
on the continuity between human and non-human animal cognition (see Shettleworth, 2012) 73 
and the status of Darwin’s famous claim that “the difference in mind between man and the 74 
higher animals … is certainly one of degree and not of kind” (Darwin, 1871, p. 105). 75 
However, as Greenwood (this issue) points out, the connected debates over 76 
continuity/discontinuity of cognitive processes between humans and other animals and over 77 
the continuity/discontinuity of associative and inferential processes come with a great deal of 78 
(typically unacknowledged) historical baggage.  In making this history more explicitly 79 
available Greenwood provides a timely caution against expecting entirely systematic and 80 
general answers in this field.   81 
On one side of the debate, people have rightfully argued that while animals exhibit 82 
remarkably complex behaviour, such complexity does in itself not rule out that behaviour is 83 
determined by associative principles (Dickinson, 2012). Elementary associative principles, 84 
particularly when operating in combination, can yield surprisingly complex and rich 85 
behaviour (see Haselgrove, this issue). On the other side, people have rejected the idea that an 86 
associative explanation of behaviour should by default trump a more cognitive account for the 87 
same behaviour (see Hanus, this issue). While Morgan’s Canon (Morgan, 1894; see 88 
Greenwood, this issue) indeed suggests that “lower” explanations for a given animal 89 
behaviour should be preferred over “higher” explanations, proper epistemological justification 90 
for Morgan’s canon has been found wanting (Heyes, 2012). Moreover, the Canon is open to 91 
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multiple interpretations and may support vastly different conclusions depending for instance 92 
on the scope of findings that is considered or the level of taxonomy at which it is applied – 93 
e.g., at the level of an entire class (e.g., the cognitive functioning of mammals), at the level of 94 
a specific order (e.g., the cognitive functioning of rodents), or at the level of a selected subset 95 
of a class (e.g., the cognitive functioning of all mammals other than humans). For example, it 96 
is now widely accepted that human cognition cannot fully be accounted for on the basis of 97 
purely associative principles. In the human causal learning field, discussion is now between 98 
those that support a single-process propositional view of human learning (e.g., Boddez, De 99 
Houwer, & Beckers, in press; De Houwer, 2009) and those that argue for a dual-process 100 
model (e.g., McLaren et al., 2014). Given that state of affairs, any comprehensive theory of 101 
learning that also aims to encompass human learning will need to include non-associative 102 
processes. But what is most parsimonious then: to assume that learning in non-human animals 103 
reflects simpler associative processes only, thus creating different theories for learning in 104 
different mammalian species, or assuming that supposedly more complex theories that explain 105 
human learning are also applicable to non-human mammals (thereby increasing the 106 
complexity of explanation for most mammalian species, but maintaining a single overall 107 
theoretical framework across mammalian species)? Greenwood (this issue) further argues that 108 
simplicity at one level of explanation (i.e., the biological level) need not be isomorphic with 109 
simplicity at another level of explanation (i.e., the psychological level). We would add that, 110 
considering arguments for a careful distinction between functional and cognitive levels of 111 
explanation within psychology (De Houwer, Hughes, & Barnes-Holmes, this issue; Hughes, 112 
De Houwer, & Perugini, in press), simplicity at the functional or behavioural level need not 113 
be isomorphic to simplicity at the cognitive or mechanistic level of explanation.  114 
In summary, despite being so commonly invoked, Morgan’s Canon does not appear 115 
to provide much help in choosing between different accounts of animal behaviour.  Instead, it 116 
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could be considered as an example of the sort of systematic general principle that Greenwood 117 
cautions us not to expect to work.  But if we cannot rely on general principles to arbitrate 118 
between positions, then what should we do instead? The answer would appear to be 119 
deceptively simple: start without prior assumptions for or against particular classes of theories 120 
and look to developing decisive experiments (an idea echoed more or less explicitly in all the 121 
contributions to this special section). This is in no way a novel view (see Heyes, 2012), but its 122 
widespread acceptance should help breaking the stalemate created by incompatible default 123 
assumptions of principle. While it is important not to trivialise the difficulty in moving 124 
beyond established assumptions (see Hanus, this issue, for a discussion of some of these), the 125 
overview provided by Greenwood (this issue) may help in making it explicit that some 126 
entrenched positions owe more to history than to scientific principle. 127 
 128 
Clarifying the terms of the debate. 129 
To begin the process of developing decisive experiments without a-priori assumptions 130 
about general classes of explanation, it would be helpful to set out as clearly as possible what 131 
it is, and what it is not, that both sides of the debate disagree on. De Houwer and colleagues 132 
(this issue) begin their contribution by making a clear distinction between the behavioural or 133 
functional level of analysis (what it is that humans and non-human animals do and do not do) 134 
and the cognitive level of analysis (what difference in underlying cognitive capacities we 135 
infer from those behavioural differences). Clearly distinguishing between those levels should 136 
serve to illuminate the exact nature of the controversy.  Sometimes, less than optimal research 137 
designs will cause disagreement about what it is that animals actually do, in functional terms, 138 
such as adapting their inspections of a food-containing hide in response to the potential 139 
presence or absence of a human observer (Taylor, Miller, & Gray, 2012, versus Dymond, 140 
Haselgrove, & McGregor, 2013; see Haselgrove, this issue) . More often, however, there is 141 
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reasonable agreement about similarities and differences between human and non-human 142 
animals at the functional level, but strong disagreement about what those imply for the 143 
cognitive level – in particular when there are multiple candidate mechanisms in associative 144 
and inferential terms which are consistent with the same functional behaviours. 145 
A second issue for clarification is what exactly is meant by “associative” or 146 
“rational” in the context of this debate.  Implicit within the contributions by Hanus (this 147 
issue), as well as by Dwyer and Waldmann (this issue), is the idea that “associative” is often 148 
shorthand for a whole class of models, with various degrees of complexity. Even when each 149 
individual model is clearly specified on its own terms, considering the multiplicity of models 150 
and principles as a whole does not necessarily allow a simple unambiguous account for a 151 
given set of behaviours. Moreover, the diversification of contemporary associative theory can 152 
make it hard for those outside the field to know what principles are captured by this very 153 
general term (Hanus, this issue) and lead to the perception that associative theory can explain 154 
almost any possible pattern of behaviour (especially if applied in a post-hoc manner). Hanus 155 
rightfully argues that an associative explanation is to be preferred only if it is possible to come 156 
up with a clear and precise prediction of an experimental observation, not if it merely 157 
manages to posthoc explain anything. In such a case, a theory that provides precise prediction 158 
should be considered more parsimonious empirically. That principle ought to be applied with 159 
caution, however. While prediction is important in science (just like simplicity), the fact that 160 
one account predicted an effect and another only explained it post-hoc is not a logical proof 161 
that the first account is correct. Moreover, a similar argument about the excessive power of 162 
post-hoc explanation and opacity to outsiders can be made regarding cognitive or rational 163 
accounts of behaviour. Still, by placing the emphasis on the predictive value of different 164 
theoretical accounts, the challenge laid out in Hanus’ contribution is for associative theory to 165 
be specified in a way that allows the expert and non-expert to know what it predicts.  166 
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In this light, the contribution by Haselgrove to this special section is particularly 167 
valuable in reviewing the current state of associative theory and providing an integrated 168 
description of a number of otherwise separate models and principles (as well as highlighting 169 
freely available resources which would facilitate simulating different models). This material is 170 
presented through a discussion of what needs to be done to overcome associative accounts, 171 
thereby setting a bar for anyone who wants to claim that a certain instance of non-human 172 
animal behaviour (or human behaviour, for that matter) defies an associative explanation.  173 
One additional aspect of Haselgrove’s contribution is to highlight something that 174 
associative accounts explicitly do not do – namely say anything about how two events are 175 
connected (see also Dwyer & Waldmann, this issue).  The importance of the relationships 176 
between events is central to the contribution by De Houwer et al (this issue).  De Houwer et 177 
al. discuss a functional-cognitive approach, and propose a new candidate distinction between 178 
human and non-human cognition that at the same time appears to allow for both some 179 
continuity and for some qualitative distinction between species, in terms of the arbitrariness of 180 
the types of relations that subjects can learn to respond to. To illustrate, humans can learn to 181 
relate almost any arbitrary stimuli in a multitude of ways, and derive novel relations as a 182 
result (e.g., to relate the word GLASS with the object glass and to relate the word VERRE to 183 
the object GLASS after it has been related to the word GLASS). We can learn and derive 184 
those types of relations like sameness, oppositeness, and others, for seemingly any arbitrary 185 
pair of stimuli. Non-humans, it appears, can also learn to respond to the relation between 186 
objects (e.g., learning to respond to the sameness of two stimuli presented in succession; e.g., 187 
Peña, Pitts, & Galizio, 2006) but only for stimuli that are non-arbitrarily related (e.g., 188 
physically identical).  189 
Having considered (and rejected) the idea that broad general principles like Morgan’s 190 
Canon could provide a means of arbitrating between competing accounts, and having looked 191 
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at ways to clarify the exact issues in dispute, the next step is to consider the sort of empirical 192 
work which might help answer the questions that have been proposed. 193 
 194 
Developing empirical tests 195 
 As we implied above, focusing on developing decisive experimental tests is simple 196 
only on the surface – as an answer to how to overcome the lack of progress in the field it begs 197 
the critical question by assuming we know what genuinely diagnostic tests would be. But do 198 
we? As we noted above, a multitude of research papers are being presented as demonstrating 199 
animal behaviour that cannot be explained associatively (and many arguing the opposite).  We 200 
must assume that the authors of these papers believed that their work was diagnostic (at least 201 
at the time it was prepared for publication), and yet the field has remained in an effective 202 
stalemate. This brings us to the final question raised in the special section: what can be done 203 
to raise the probability that empirical tests will actually resolve critical issues?  Or to put it 204 
another way, how do we ensure that one camp will take work performed by the other one 205 
seriously?  We have already considered the ways in which clearly specifying the nature of 206 
different classes of theoretical accounts and resetting entrenched default positions could 207 
improve the quality of the debate.  The same things should also enhance the impact of 208 
experimental work: For example, a better working knowledge of associative theory should 209 
assist in designing experiments aimed at disconfirming its predictions. However, there are 210 
many steps between theory and experimental design, and so improving the quality of 211 
theoretical knowledge will only go so far. 212 
 One possible way to make progress is to embrace the fact that researchers from 213 
different perspectives also bring different empirical and analytical expertise.  Instead of 214 
performing research entirely “in house” and relegating the input from other perspectives to an 215 
after-the-fact analysis of the experimental work performed, the complementary expertise from 216 
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different perspectives can be used in the development and conduct of the experiments 217 
themselves.  That is, people from across the aisle can collaborate to develop a design that both 218 
parties agree could unambiguously decide between an associative and a rational/inferential 219 
account, and then perform that work.  The contribution by Dwyer and Waldmann (this issue) 220 
represents an (incomplete) example of this process.  221 
Given the divergence in perspectives, this is expecting a great deal from adversarial 222 
collaboration, as the exercise has proven to be far from trivial in execution, and it is unlikely 223 
to settle all debates (after all, no one researcher is a perfect representative of their “camp”). 224 
Notwithstanding these caveats, where such collaborations are feasible, they should prove to 225 
be a useful tool.  This is partially because they instantiate the general ideas that we have 226 
already considered: The focus on empirical collaboration assumes that it is data rather than 227 
general principle that will decide the issue; the involvement of researchers from different 228 
perspectives mitigates against the unexamined influence of biased default assumptions; and 229 
joint experimental design requires explicit pre-experimental specification of the relevant 230 
predictions. Moreover, the very fact that the process as a whole is based on researchers from 231 
different perspectives working together means that they are taking each other seriously. We 232 
would also note that the times are clearly receptive to such adversarial collaborations, as they 233 
are on the rise in other fields of psychology (e.g., Matzke et al., 2015).  Other emerging trends 234 
in experimental practice, in particular pre-registration and pre-experiment review (Chambers, 235 
Dienes, McIntosh, Rotshtein, & Willmes, 2014), also reflect key aspects of this approach 236 
through recognising the benefit of making the basis for theoretical claims explicit and open to 237 
external scrutiny prior to the conduct of experimental work1.   238 
While we have high hopes for progress based on collaboration and cooperation 239 
between different theoretical camps, it is also instructive to compare the broad general 240 
analyses of principle (from Greenwood, Hanus, Haselgrove, De Houwer et al.) against the 241 
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more humble aims of the experimental work proposed by Dwyer and Waldmann. These 242 
authors are careful to point out that their proposed studies are not aimed at arbitrating between 243 
associative and inferential accounts in general, but instead are aimed at comparing one 244 
particular aspect of one inferential account (namely the influence of representing uncertainty 245 
within a causal model) against specified associative alternatives (and even this comparison is 246 
contingent on a number of simplifying assumptions). This is not a lack of ambition in Dwyer 247 
and Waldmann’s proposal, but instead reflects the fact that empirical work is typically highly 248 
incremental, addressing focused comparisons between specified theoretical alternatives one at 249 
a time. 250 
 251 
Cautious optimism about the ways forward 252 
The six papers in this special section, and the meeting which inspired them, represent 253 
the efforts of people from a range of usually competing theoretical perspectives to explore 254 
together possible ways to reinvigorate the somewhat stalled progress in investigating the 255 
cognitive capacities of non-human animals. This is not an easy process – enculturation in a 256 
particular tradition imposes biases, some of which are explicit but many of which are implicit. 257 
Recognising these biases, and looking to move beyond the heuristics which reflect them to 258 
focusing on potentially discriminating empirical studies is a key step in this process. There 259 
needs to be a willingness to approach issues with an open mind and to try and find common 260 
ground, however limited it may be. Mutual recognition that many of our disagreements are 261 
situated at a cognitive level of analysis, which implies both sides of the debate rely on fallible 262 
inferences from data rather than on facts that are directly given, might be helpful in this 263 
regard. The rich set of principles represented by associative processes and the encompassing 264 
nature of inferential processes are both too broad to be amenable to direct falsification 265 
through a limited number of empirical studies.  And nor should we expect them to be. Both a 266 
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historical reflection, and the example of dual-process accounts in human cognitive 267 
psychology, caution against the expectation of simple and sweeping explanations applying 268 
generally across species and situations.  We may have described this special section as 269 
“reasoning versus associations” but instead of seeking the (probably mythical) one true 270 
explanation of all animals behaviour, the route to genuine and lasting progress may well lie in 271 
looking incrementally for the best account of a multitude of specific behaviours. Overall, we 272 
feel there should be an emphasis on being collaborative rather than being adversarial – in the 273 
end, we all share the common goal of wanting to find out more about animal behaviour and its 274 
underlying mechanisms.  275 
  276 
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Footnote 277 
1 We would also acknowledge other recent developments in psychological research, including 278 
the emphasis on replication and meta analysis, detailed considerations of experimental power, 279 
and the limitations of classical statistics (along with the potential of Bayesian alternatives; see 280 
Lindsay, 2015). For new empirical work to have a lasting impact, it must also be reliable, and 281 
to the extent that these trends drive more reliable experimental work they will be as important 282 
for comparative psychology as they will be elsewhere.    283 
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